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Abstract 
Callon’s performativity thesis has illuminated how economic theories and calculative devices 
shape markets, but has been challenged for its neglect of the organizational, institutional and 
political context. Our seven-year qualitative study of a large financial data company found that 
the company’s initial attempt to change the responsible investment field through a performative 
approach failed because of the constraints posed by field practices and organizational norms 
on the design of the calculative device. However, the company was subsequently able to put in 
place another form of performativity by attending to the normative and regulative associations 
of the device. We theorize this route to performativity by proposing the concept of performative 
work, which designates the necessary institutional work to enable translation and the 
subsequent adoption of the device. We conclude by considering the implications of 
performative work for the performativity and the institutional work literatures.  
                                                        
1 This work was supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh 
Framework Programme: ERC-2010-StG 263604-SRITECH.  
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Performativity and Institutional Work in Responsible Investment 
The performativity thesis developed by Callon (1998) and MacKenzie and Millo (2003) has 
prompted an important but unresolved debate among sociologists and management scholars 
(Fourcade, 2007; J.-P. Gond, Cabantous, Harding & Learmonth, 2015). At the core of 
performativity lies the hypothesis that statements by economists or other social scientists are 
not ‘outside the world(s) to which they refer’, but ‘actively engaged in the constitution of the 
reality that they describe’ (Callon, 2007, p. 318). By privileging the role of theories and 
material devices over established social forces such as institutions, norms or social relations, 
performativity provided an original account of markets and the role of economists in them 
(Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005). Yet the theory has also met with resistance: academic 
critics in institutional theory and elsewhere have faulted performativity for ignoring the 
organizational, institutional, and political context (Fligstein & Goldstein, 2010; Mirowski & 
Nik-Khah, 2007) and for not laying out clear scope conditions for its applicability (Felin & 
Foss, 2009; Zuckerman, 2012). The theory’s proponents have subsequently provided a 
broader account of performativity, including the role of public policy and organizational 
forces (Callon, 2008; Millo & MacKenzie, 2009). Yet these proponents did not relate their 
contributions back to the original critiques, leaving unaddressed the concern that 
organizational and institutional processes are being neglected.  
The present study aims at addressing such gap by bringing back the concept of 
translation to explore the micro-politics in the design, promotion and successful use of 
calculative devices (Cabantous & Gond, 2011; Callon, 1986; Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016; 
Latour, 1987). Translation, or the process of getting potential allies interested and then 
controlled (Akrich, Callon & Latour, 2002a, 2002b; Callon & Latour, 1981), was a central 
building block of the theoretical predecessor of performativity, Actor-Network Theory. 
Performativity gained scholarly attention for the remarkable ability it accorded to material 
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devices in the reshaping of markets, but this attention was partly achieved by 
underemphasizing the micro-politics that characterize the work of the performateur, that is, 
translation, and privileging instead the role played by material tools.  
By bringing back translation to the study of calculative devices, scholars may be able 
to better incorporate the micro-political into performativity. Doing so also opens up new 
possibilities to establish a theoretical bridge with institutional theory, as performativity can 
contribute to our understanding of how institutions, defined as the “cognitive, normative, and 
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior” 
(Scott, 1995: 33) are created, maintained, and disrupted. The purposeful activity of actors in 
this process is the focus of the literature on institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). Building on it, we bring together performativity’s focus 
on materiality with institutional work’s attention to normative and regulative structures. 
Our study advances this agenda with an examination of the efforts exhibited by a large 
financial data company in the responsible investment field. Our research site, Visual Markets 
(a pseudonym), is a US-based leading provider of financial data and technology with a vast 
installed base of users. Founded three decades ago, Visual gives users access to real-time 
financial information and it is part of their “infrastructure for calculability” (Cabantous & 
Gond, 2011) of financial markets. Visual’s unique formula turned the company into a global 
giant, mirroring the expansion of the capital markets over the past decades. 
Starting in 2008, Visual Markets developed a calculative device aimed at promoting a 
new investment practice, environmental, social and governance (ESG) integration, in the 
responsible investment field. This “issue field” (Hoffman, 1999; Zietsma, Groenewegen, 
Logue & Hinings, 2017) brought together a diverse set of actors (asset owners, social 
movements, investment managers, banks, data providers, regulators, and government) around 
the goal of integrating ESG factors in the financial investment process (Cowton 1994; 
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Giamporcaro & Gond 2016, Louche & Lydenberg, 2010; Gond & Boxenbaum 2013). Using 
a qualitative research design, we followed the company’s efforts to launch and promote this 
device for seven years (2008-2015) and examined its initial plan, results, and changes in 
strategy. Our key empirical finding centers on a shift in strategy that took place in response to 
lower-than-expected sales. The new strategy centered on aligning Visual’s product within 
other units of the organization, connecting it with the customers, and promoting the 
responsible investment field through NGOs and regulatory influence.  
Our study contributes to the theory of performativity by bringing to the fore the 
micro-political dynamics of market change through calculative devices. First, by presenting 
the effectiveness of performativity as successful translation, our study shows that in issue 
fields, exclusive reliance on calculative devices for performative projects face normative 
resistance and prove ineffective. Second, our study points to an alternative route to 
performativity, namely one based on both institutional and material associations. We refer to 
this approach as performative work, and show how such concept can address some of the 
concerns raised by critics of performativity and contribute to the literature on institutional 
work. 
Bringing Back Translation in Performativity 
As originally formulated by Callon (1998), the performativity thesis provided a novel and 
powerful account of how calculative devices shape economic actors and markets. Callon 
argued that, “economics, in the broad sense of the term (…) shapes and formats the economy, 
rather than observing how it functions” (Callon, 1998, p. 2). Performativity thus posits that 
markets are shaped by calculative devices (Callon & Muniesa, 2005), where economic 
activity is shaped by economic theories that influence the design of calculative tools and then 
shape economic action. The potential of the performativity thesis is best illustrated by the 
seminal work of MacKenzie and Millo (2003), who showed that whereas the Black-Scholes 
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equation did not initially describe option prices with accuracy, its subsequent adoption by 
floor brokers produced a gradual convergence between the formula’s predictions and actual 
prices.  
Performativity, however, has met with vigorous resistance.  Institutional theorists, 
economics historians, and critical management scholars faulted performativity scholars for 
losing sight of the political and normative forest in which financial models are developed and 
used  (Fligstein, 2010; Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2007; Whittle & Spicer, 2008). As Mirowski 
and Nik-Khah (2007, p. 217) wrote, “too much concentration on machine metaphors tends to 
distract critical attention from some of the most important processes going on underneath.”  
It is ironic, however, that performativity would be criticized for not confronting the 
question of power2. Its founder, Callon (1998), presents performativity a continuation of a 
prior intellectual project developed with Bruno Latour, Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which 
addressed the role of power in the constitution of science and society at large (Callon & 
Latour, 1981). ”No one,” Latour (1990, p. 159) wrote in his analysis of Hobbes’ Leviathan, 
“has yet deconstructed his [Hobbes’] vocabulary of power, society, group, calculation of 
interests and sovereignty.” Latour claimed this intellectual space for ANT. Similarly, Latour 
often referred to the strategies he documented as “Machiavellian,” that is, concerned with 
power. Furthermore, a whole stream of ANT, sometimes referred to as “ANT and After,” 
(Law and Hassard 1999), directly addressed the question of power and planted the seeds for a 
form of critical performativity (Alcadipani & Hassard, 2010;  Spicer, Alvesson & Karreman, 
2009) that explores how alternative organizational arrangements can be performed within a 
capitalist economy (Leca, Gond & Barin Cruz, 2014). Why, then, the charge that 
performativity ignores politics? One potential reason might have been the conflation of the 
Callon-MacKenzie approach to performativity with other approaches (Austin, 1962; Butler, 
                                                        
2 Cabantous and Gond (2015), in a footnote, also found these critiques surprising.  
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1990; Lyotard, 1984) that share with it little more than the name (see Gond et al., 2015 for 
review of these). We suggest that the role of politics in reshaping markets may have been 
obscured by the bracketing of much of the analytical power of ANT under terms such as 
assemblage (Latour, 2005), socio-technical agencements (Callon, 2007), and market 
agencements (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010; Callon, 2016). Assemblage refers to the association 
of heterogeneous (human and non-human) entities that need to come together for 
performativity to occur (Latour, 2005, p. 2). Agencement, emphasizes the lack of a divide 
between human agents and the objects that have been arranged, and its agentic properties 
(Callon, 2007, p. 320). From the perspective of any of the actors involved, the process of 
putting together an assemblage is translation, but Callon bracketed this work under the term 
agencement.  
One example of such bracketing is given by MacKenzie and Millo’s (2003) original 
study of Black-Scholes. The piece left unexplained the crucial question of why would traders 
adopt an inaccurate model; in a follow-up piece to their seminal analysis, however, Millo and 
MacKenzie’s (2009) revealed the translation work that undergird the adoption of Black 
Scholes. Traders did not simply take up Black-Scholes’ for its elegance and rigor; the 
widespread adoption of Black-Scholes took place in parallel with the diffusion of new risk 
management tools (2009, p. 638), and which necessitated the use of Black-Scholes: the banks 
that wanted to refine their risk management methodology simply needed to adopt Black-
Scholes. The contrast between the MacKenzie and Millo (2003) and Millo and MacKenzie 
(2009) brings to the fore the need to account for translation, for only by doing so can scholars 
bring back micro-politics in the study of market devices and reveal the forces behind the 
success of the calculative device. 
Given the above, what do Actor-Network scholars precisely mean by “translation”? In 
their foundational paper, Callon and Latour (1981) introduce the term as “all the negotiations, 
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intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion and violence thanks to which an actor or force takes 
(…) authority to speak or act on behalf of another actor” (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 279). For 
instance, Callon and Latour (1981) show that engineers at Electricité de France (EDF) 
justified their proposal for the development of a new electric car by speaking on behalf of 
cities and the public: “the project conjectured not only that the techno-scientific problems 
could be overcome but also that French social structure would change radically” (Callon, 
1987, p. 84). Subsequently, Law and Callon (1988) later referred to these designers as 
“engineers-sociologists” for their ability to mix in their argument social trends and technical 
factors.  
But what makes a translation effort effective? Callon (1987) emphasized several 
elements. First, the strength of the resulting actor-network hinges on the durability of its 
associations, which in turn depends on the durability of its individual points and connections. 
Second, this durability can be enhanced by turning the assemblage into a simplified black box 
that reduces the complexity of the elements in it. Third, such black boxing is only possible to 
the extent that it is supported by other entities in the actor-network, a process that Callon 
refers to as juxtaposition.  
Latour (1987) extended the material dimension of translation further by proposing that 
translation can be secured by assembling all the various elements into a physical artifact or 
machine: “the simplest means of transforming the juxtaposed set of allies into a whole that 
acts as one,” he wrote, “is to assemble forces to one another, that is, to build a machine” 
(Latour 1987, p. 131). Making material the associations between the various elements 
addresses a key problem of the engineer, namely, “to control [the allies’] behavior in order to 
make their actions predictable” (Latour, 1987, p. 108; emphasis added).  
In sum, the essence of translation is getting potential allies interested, and then 
controlled. Latour emphasized that he used the word translation not only for its linguistic 
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meaning but also for its political one, stating that translation moved interests and people, as 
“translating interests means at once offering a new interpretation of these interests and 
channeling people in different directions” (Latour, 1987, p. 117). This political meaning of 
translation, however, has received much less scholarly attention than the semiotic one (the 
process of translating words and meaning from one language/ context to another). Influenced 
by the Scandinavian school of institutionalism (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996) researchers 
have favored the semiotic meaning of translation, studying the local adaptation of practices as 
they travel across contexts and geographic boundaries (Ansari, Fiss & Zajac, 2010; 
Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005; Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008, see 
Waeraas & Nielsen 2016 for a review of the different streams of translation research). To 
advance our understanding of performativity, and counter the criticism of neglecting power, 
we suggest refocusing our attention on the political meaning of translation and the strategies 
that performateurs employ in the process.  
The above has important implications for the analysis of markets. As Actor-Network 
Theory evolved into the performativity literature, the explicit focus on the micro-politics of 
association described above disappeared from the foreground. Having established the power 
conferred by a material black box that enrolls and controls the interests of those who can 
determine its success, Callon (1998) went on to consider what would happen if that black box 
were not an engine, a car, or another mechanical device, but instead a tool in the hands of a 
market actor. Economic calculation, he argued, is a practice, and as such it requires tools; by 
using a black box for the purpose of calculating in markets, economic actors may end up 
reconstituting the market in line with the ideas that informed the black box, typically arising 
from economics. Callon’s focus thus shifted from the engineer-sociologist to the creator of 
the calculative device, namely, the economist-performateur, which for Callon is not limited 
to academic economists, but to any economic actor.  
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Given the importance of politics in the performative processes, we see important 
opportunities to establish theoretical connections between performativity and institutional 
theory. Institutional theorists have also grappled with the question of how market institutions 
are constituted (Fligstein, 1996; Fligstein & Mara-Drita, 1996) and change (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury & Hirsch, 2010), but despite notable encouragement (Fourcade, 
2007; Lounsbury, 2008; Powell & Colyvas, 2008) there has been little attempt to reconcile 
this literature with insights from performativity and the construction of calculative 
infrastructure in markets. Déjean, Gond, and Leca (2004) is the most notable exception, as 
they showed how the construction of the calculative infrastructure of socially responsible 
investment in France legitimated the industry and contributed to establishing the institutional 
entrepreneur (the ARESE rating agency), thus bridging the two processes. However, their 
focus was on calculability rather than its performative effects. Beyond the context of financial 
markets, institutional theory has long recognized the fact that the cognitive, normative and 
symbolic components of institutions can be instantiated in material practices and artifacts 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991), but with few exception (Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Hargadon & 
Douglas, 2001; Jones & Massa, 2013), most research on materiality has focused on practices 
rather than artifacts (Jones, Boxenbaum & Anthony, 2013). 
In this paper we propose a path to reconcile these literatures, drawing on the literature 
on institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Proponents of institutional work are 
concerned with “purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). As such, it 
provides a complementary perspective to performativity and its emphasis on models, 
formulae and material devices. Furthermore, the literature on institutional work has been 
paying increasing attention to power (Currie, Lockett, Finn, Martin & Waring, 2012; 
Lawrence, Leca & Zilber, 2013; Rojas, 2010). For instance, studying the institutionalization 
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of management fashions, Perkman and Spicer (2008) define political work as that which 
“involves influencing the development of rules, property rights and boundaries in the attempt 
to anchor an institution within the wider social system” (Perkmann & Spicer, 2008: 817). 
Similarly, in their study of how the FTSE4Good index emerged as a standard for socially 
responsible corporate behavior, Slager, Gond and Moon (2012) highlighted the regulatory 
power of standard-setting actors.   
One limitation of the institutional work literature, however, is that despite its initial 
emphasis on “reflective purposefulness”, most of the empirical research has been historical 
and retrospective, thus methodologically unfit to capture empirically, and advance, our 
understanding of the multiple dimensions of agency entailed in the process. Building on 
Emirbayer and Mische (1988), Battilana and Aunno (2009) suggested that intentionality in 
institutional work should be interpreted as a multidimensional construct, comprising iterative 
(past-oriented), projective (future-oriented), and practical-evaluative (present-oriented) 
dimensions, and speculated that each dimension might dominate in specific forms of 
institutional work or stage of the institutionalization process. However, with the exception of 
Raviola and Norbäck (2013), the different dimensions of agency have been understudied. The 
performativity literature, we would add, provides a theoretical language to extend our 
understanding of reflective purposefulness and how material devices fit in this process.  
In sum, unpacking the genealogy of performativity in actor-network theory reveals the 
central role of translation and the ways in which this process was bracketed as the literature 
moved to performativity. Bringing translation back to performativity, we contend, can restore 
its micro-political dimension and give voice to the actors’ theorizing in the process, that is, 
bring up their plans, schemes and allies, as well as their enemies. These considerations, 
however, prompt the following question: how does translation take place in financial 
markets? More specifically, how is it constrained by institutional factors, and what is the role 
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of institutional work in the process? 
Methods 
Our study comprises a seven-year qualitative study of product development at Visual Markets 
(2008-2015), complemented with an interview-based study of the responsible investment 
field. Given its preeminent position in the financial sector and the large resources it 
commands, the initial failure of Visual’s product to meet its sales target was “revelatory” 
(Yin, 2009) of the challenges entailed in translation and performativity. Furthermore, as 
“individual organizations are important venues for institutional work” (Kraatz, 2009, p. 84), 
our access to Visual gave us a unique opportunity to follow actors as they engaged the 
coalface of institutions (Barley, 2008). Finally, it is key to emphasize the embedded 
longitudinal nature of our research design, with four levels of observation: field, practices, 
organization, and device (See Figure 1 for a timeline with the key events). The long 
observation window, and the ethnographic nature of our study, enables us to understand the 
performative process in real-time, and from the actors’ perspective, a rare feat opportunity in 
both the performativity and the institutional work literature (Lawrence et al., 2013)  
--- Insert Figure 1 here --- 
The events we describe at Visual Markets need to be understood within the wider 
context of a shift in the field of responsible investment. Responsible investment can be 
defined as “an approach to investing that aims to incorporate environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) factors into investment decisions, to better manage risk and generate 
sustainable, long-term returns” (PRI, 2016). This definition, which emphasizes the integration 
of ESG factors, emerged only gradually and starting in 2005 (Dumas & Louche, 2016), but 
built on decades-long development of various practices that were usually referred to as 
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) (Cowton, 1994; Louche, 2004; Gond and Boxenbaum, 
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2013), and which included “engagement with corporate management, investments that 
benefit underserved communities, and the setting of social and environmental standards in 
selecting investments” (Lydenberg, 2007, p. 467). In the context of responsible investment, 
SRI has traditionally centered around a portfolio approach, and been based on the practice of 
negative screening, that is, the exclusion of stocks that failed to conform to certain values. 
SRI had been practiced for years, but remained a relatively limited investment activity in the 
US despite years of promotion by its practitioners (Arjaliès, 2010; Déjean et al., 2004; 
Guyatt, 2006; Waddock, 2008). While other investment practices, such as positive screening, 
were already actively used in the 1990s, by 2005 in the United States the Social Investment 
Forum reports that 73% of SRI assets under management (AUM) were still negatively 
screened.  
By contrast, ESG investing was introduced as the “mainstream,” alternative to 
traditional SRI (Dumas & Louche, 2016: 432) and promoted by various groups including 
(though by no means exclusively) the United Nations Environment Programme Finance 
Initiative and the Principles for Responsible Investing (PRI) (a coalition of asset owners who 
signed a commitment to invest responsibly; see Avetisyan & Ferrary, 2013). As Dumas and 
Louche (2016, p. 440) point out, with the introduction of ESG “the focus (…) shifts to 
climate change.” Furthermore, ESG “is also characterized by the combination of RI and 
corporate governance, which were so far treated separately.” In addition, ESG placed a 
greater emphasis on financial performance, albeit with a more long-term focus than 
mainstream investment (Amaeshi, 2010). The core practice of ESG investing became so-
called ESG integration, which asset managers could interpret and practice in different ways. 
To succeed in this broadening of the investor base, however, some of the reservations voiced 
by mainstream investors about data on social and environmental performance had to be 
addressed, including the uneven quality of data, greater need for comparability, and 
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transparency (Dumas & Louche, 2016, p. 447). By 2008, a survey conducted by Axa 
Investment Managers of FTfm readers concluded that ESG was the term most used by 
investors to refer to responsible investment, while SRI only ranked 4th (Financial Times, 
2008)3. The emergence of ESG was therefore an opportunity for Visual Markets, as the 
company had built a perception of objectivity among Wall Street investors by avoiding 
subjective qualitative assessments such as ratings and company research, especially on listed 
companies that were its own clients such as Wall Street banks.  
Data 
We draw upon four sources of data – interviews, observation, conferences, and archival 
material – to understand the process of development of the ESG Product at Visual Markets 
and its influence on institutional change in the field of responsible investment. 
Interviews. We conducted two sets of interviews aimed respectively at understanding 
the institutional field and the technological product. The first set included 41 interviews with 
responsible investors and the companies that served them, primarily across New York and 
London, but also in Boston, Paris and Amsterdam. These took place from December 2007 to 
August 2015. We interviewed a diverse group of individuals including executives, fund 
managers, journalists, activists and academics. Our second set of interviews took place at 
Visual Markets. We conducted 35 interviews with 16 different respondents and interviewed 
every member of the ESG Product team with the exception of the ones based in Tokyo and 
Hong Kong, and in most cases we conducted multiple interviews with each participant. We 
conducted 15 interviews with the leader of the project, and benefited from additional 
                                                        
3 Over the years, various attempts at keeping the label SRI have been explored but many of them 
underscore the trend towards ESG we describe. Starting from their 2008 report, EUROSIF kept using 
the term “SRI” but changed its meaning to “Sustainable and Responsible Investment.” (EUROSIF, 
2009). In their 2014 report, USSIF suggested a twist to the term, which now meant “sustainable, 
responsible and impact investing (SRI)” (USSIF, 2015). 
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occasions from informal interaction at public events. We also invited the project leader as a 
guest speaker to our respective universities for a combined total of six times, and observed 
the presentation of the project across a variety of audiences. Only a few of our interviews 
entailed Visual’s users, as our goal was to understand the limited adoption of Visual’s ESG 
Product.  
Observation. We visited Visual’s premises 34 times in all three locations. During 
these visits, ESG team members explained us how they were going about their work, and on 
three occasions we spent the entire day with the team. In addition to the observation, we 
negotiated access to the weekly conference calls that the team held to coordinate activity. 
Both authors attended by dialing-in like one more participant, taking notes on the discussions. 
After the call we would exchange notes to clarify doubts and confront our interpretations of 
what we had heard. We participated in a total of 16 calls, totaling almost 40 hours of 
meetings in the period 2009-2011, which is when the design team was making the key 
decisions.  
Archival material. We collected and organized a database of documents, both public 
and proprietary, totaling more than 500 pages. We had access to key proprietary sources of 
information on the ESG Product, including the original business plan of the product, which 
we analyzed to understand the assumptions behind it, in line with Callon and Latour (1981). 
Second, we obtained company data on the usage of the product once it was launched, which 
allowed us to track success. Finally, we gained access to the PowerPoint presentations used 
internally by its leader to request funds for the project. In ANT terms, the business plan and 
PowerPoint presentations allowed us to follow the actors (Latour, 1986) as they established 
associations and drew on heterogeneous elements, juxtaposed and attempted to create black 
boxes.  
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Analysis 
Building on the rich variety of data sources just described, we moved iteratively between the 
data and the themes we generated in our theorizing (Diesing, 1971; Locke, 2001; Lofland & 
Lofland, 1995). We started by discussing interviews and observations soon after we had 
conducted them. Our discussions were captured in memoranda, and these memos were the 
foundation of the emerging themes we aimed to refine in our fieldwork (Diesing, 1971; 
Lofland & Lofland, 1995). In these memos we started by using the participants’ own 
conceptualization, and the memos became the backbone of our theorizing. In this process we 
linked the local themes emerging from the field with the extant literature (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Locke, 2001). Following the practice of theoretical sampling, we sought additional 
evidence to determine the extent of empirical support for the emerging themes, and 
triangulated across multiple sources of data. Also, our interviews with most of Visual’s key 
competitors helped us balance the internal narrative of the project with the changes in the 
field. As the analysis proceeded we also prepared a timeline where we mapped (Langley, 
1999) key events at four levels: the field, the practices, the organization, and the device 
(Figure 1).  
Our empirical analysis relies on three comparisons to identify key events and draw 
associations between them (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The first is between the business plan 
laid out by Charles in 2008 and actual events. The business plan revealed Charles’ rhetoric 
and proposed associations, especially the role of self-fulfilling prophecies; it provided clear 
metrics to independently assess success or failure; and an empirical reading of competitors 
and the field at large.  
Second, we compared Visual’s first and second attempt at advancing responsible 
investment. While the first attempt relied on the calculative device, the second one relied 
primarily on institutional work. Our comparison between the two allowed us to better 
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understand the role of tools and the micro-politics of institutional change in markets. Our 
third comparison, although not as developed as the first two, relates Visual with its two main 
competitors, Merger 2 and Merger 3. The comparison suggests that Visual’s failure to grow 
sales of its ESG Product was due to its lack of ESG ratings and not due to other variables 
such as the financial crisis or the underdevelopment of the ESG field. Indeed, these factors 
also affected Merger 2 and Merger 3, yet their sales performed well. Such comparison helped 
us attribute Visual’s notable improvement in the rankings of ESG data providers between 
2012 and 2014 to the main changes that took place between those dates, namely, the 
introduction of third-party ratings, and of a new product manager.  
Performing responsible investment at Visual Markets 
Visual Market’s entry into responsible investment can be structured as three distinct stages 
(Figure 1). First, starting in 2008 Charles (a pseudonym), an executive at Visual Markets, led 
the creation of a new calculative device aimed at dominating the market for ESG data, as well 
as transforming the field of responsible investment. Second, between 2009-12 the ESG team 
that Charles led faced numerous challenges that reduced its ability to meet the sales 
objectives. Starting in 2013 however, and until 2015, the team shifted its strategy, 
abandoning the goal of market transformation and turning instead towards a greater 
connection with non-governmental organizations that advanced responsible investment, as 
well as with regulators, with the goal of stimulating compliance-driven demand for Visual’s 
product.  
Stage 1, 2008-09: A plan to perform responsible investment 
Our first acquaintance with Charles at Visual Markets took place at a panel presentation on 
responsible investment in April 2008. Charles was working on a plan to integrate 
sustainability into the data licenses sold by his company. What made the plan remarkable was 
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the company’s user base: with thousands of registered users at banks and brokerage firms, 
Visual was a giant in the financial data industry, firmly positioned at the core of the world’s 
capital markets. As Charles said: “we have access to the financial community like no other. 
So I would argue that we have the potential, more than any other company maybe in the 
world, to change the way we invest in our infrastructure, in our society, in our natural 
environment.”  
As Charles saw it, the shift that took place in the responsible investment field in 2008 
from an activist-led field to an investment-oriented one opened up an opportunity for Visual 
Markets. A fast-rising senior manager in his early forties, Charles’ professional trajectory 
straddled activism and corporate finance. Before 2008 Charles had been in charge of 
“Sustain,” a corporate social responsibility initiative at Visual that he had envisioned in 2006 
to reduce carbon emissions. “I am,” Charles would say, “that annoying guy who tells 
everybody to print double-sided.”  
In 2008 Charles built on the legitimacy and visibility of Sustain to launch the ESG 
project. At the time, a new company President with a strong interest in sustainability had just 
arrived at Visual, creating potential support. Visual, Charles argued in a formal proposal to 
Visual’s senior management, ought to start providing environmental, social and governance 
data (ESG) for investors. Charles’ presentation not only entailed an impassioned discourse, 
but also a detailed analysis of the industry, a set of assumptions and projections, and 
accompanying representations in PowerPoint and Excel documents that we were able to 
analyze. Based on these, we learned that Charles’ case relied on four key elements. 
First, the ESG Product advocated by Charles entailed new affordances. Specifically, a 
combined search functionality that would be made possible by the addition of new fields to 
Visual’s original finance database. The ESG data would not only be displayed on the same 
screen as traditional financial data, but could also be used to define subsets of industries. By 
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relating financial performance to ESG factors, the fine-grained quantitative approach to 
decision-making that had traditionally characterized mainstream finance could be brought to 
bear on ESG investment. 
Second, Charles banked on the rise of a new type of actor in the market. Charles not 
only expected customers from existing SRI investors, but from those in ESG, including 
mainstream asset managers in Wall Street and the City of London; this was important 
because numerous SRI investors lacked the financial resources to be customers of Visual. 
Charles was thus relying on the growing presence of executives that combined the practices 
and methods of capitalism with the values and aspirations of activism. Charles had his own 
term for these executives: he called them “ESG converts.” 
Third, Charles expected his plan to shape the actions of yet another set of actors, 
listed corporations, in a way that would help his cause. Charles expected that the provision of 
ESG information would unleash more sustainability reporting by listed companies. Greater 
data availability would then encourage the shift to responsible investment, and feed back into 
even greater disclosure. He explained: 
Of course, the dream being that if we put that data out there, it will inspire those companies. 
Arguably what you could say is, you know, Competitor A had that data, Competitor B didn’t. 
So therefore Competitor A, if they were considered good performers, got more money. 
Competitor B goes, Goddammit. Fundamentally, my financials are just as good or better. I 
need to go ahead and provide this data. 
 
That is, data availability would unleash a virtuous cycle, and lead to a change in the practices 
among corporations as much as those of investors.  
Fourth, Charles expected Visual to co-opt existing rival data vendors in SRI. Charles 
expected Visual to seize one third of the entire market in ESG data by offering sustainability 
data in a less costly manner, that is, by “commoditizing” the data. Because Visual charged its 
customers a flat rate for using the PC license, the additional cost of using ESG data for 
existing customers would be zero. As he put it:  
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We are the commodity guys. We will make it cheaper to do that [invest responsibly]. And 
then, then it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, which is what is really exciting to me. 
Investors will, all things being equal, if they have the information, put their money with the 
guy who’s got good. ESG performance, because it is a proxy for good management. And, 
why not? It makes you feel better. 
 
In other words, lowering the barriers to responsible investment would make it more likely to 
be adopted.  
The various elements of Charles’ plan can be seen as an effort in translation, that is, in 
aligning the goals of various actors to advance Charles’ plan and make Visual the obligatory 
passage of the responsible investment field. The plan called for reinterpreting the interests 
and instigating changes in the actions of three sets of actors: mainstream investors would now 
start thinking about social and environmental factors, responsible investors would abandon 
their existing data providers and turn to Visual, and corporations would start reporting their 
social and environmental performance.  
Furthermore, Charles plan included (although he was not very explicit about it) a 
underlying theory of how financial markets work. This was a financialized version of the 
stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984). Charles explained to us that, 
The argument is (and I’ve seen some research on this) the investors will… all things 
being equal, they have the information – the environmental, social, and governance 
information – and (…) they will definitely put their money with the guy who’s got 
good… ESG performance, because it is a proxy for good management. 
 
Thus, as used by Charles, the expression “ESG data” implied an instantiation of the 
stakeholder theory of the firm, suggesting that long-term profitability required addressing the 
needs of stakeholders (Gond & Nyberg, 2016).  
Taken together, the various associations proposed by Charles promised a radical 
transformation of the field triggered by a market process, the self-fulfilling prophecy. Like 
the transformation of option prices resulting from the adoption of the Black-Scholes formula 
documented by MacKenzie and Millo (2003), this self-fulfilling prophecy would confer 
Charles the power to firmly establish responsibility in financial markets: once the widespread 
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adoption of the ESG Product made environmental and social factors relevant, investors would 
have no choice but to adopt the Product, or see the financial performance of their funds 
suffer.  
Charles pitched his plan at Visual Markets in October 2008. The top management of 
the company quickly agreed to fund the ESG project, although with five million dollars rather 
than the twenty million that Charles originally asked for. Undeterred, Charles set out to 
assemble a team that would decide on the format of the data and design the user interface, 
and do so in a way that would interest mainstream and SRI investors alike. During 2008 and 
the first half of 2009, Charles met with Wall Street banks and funds in the socially 
responsible investment community and the view of these investors was taken into great 
consideration while the perspective of NGOs were not.  
However, the precarious position of the ESG team within Visual left the team 
isolated. The team was led formally by an executive based in Second City, but was de facto 
managed by Charles, who stayed at the Chairman’s office in Headquarter City. The day-to-
day operations were supervised by Dimitris, a middle manager from a suburban Data Center 
location. Dimitris was in charge of two junior employees located on the same site, Pietra and 
Takumi, and two others elsewhere. Pietra was the “resident tree hugger” at Visual, and 
Takumi hoped that working in the ESG Product would enhance his career prospects. The 
team coordinated with the rest of the company through Charles in weekly conference calls. 
The entire ESG team, in other words, hung from the dotted line that linked them with Charles 
and the Chairman’s office, forming a tenuous connection with the customer-facing units of 
Visual.  
Despite these structural challenges, the ESG Product was effectively launched in 
August 2009. The product consisted of 181 data points on environmental, social and 
governance performance of 2700 publicly listed companies across the world. These data 
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points included greenhouse gas emissions, water consumption, number of days lost to strikes, 
etc. It borrowed its selection of variables from those used by the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), a UN-sponsored non-profit organization that had become the de-facto standard for 
corporate sustainability reporting (Etzion & Ferraro, 2010). Visual’s ESG Product aimed at 
making the product more attractive to mainstream investors by including only “as reported” 
data by companies, that is, eschewing the use of so-called “derived data” that other data 
vendors created by algebraic transformation of other sources when the original data was 
missing. The ESG Product also avoided subjective ratings that other data vendors were 
providing. These choices were consistent with Visual’s preference for objective, self-reported 
data, but misaligned with the practices of the investors Charles saw as the potential “ESG 
converts.” In 2009, Charles’ promotion to Visual’s Chief Sustainability Officer with 
worldwide responsibilities for various environmental and social initiatives suggested that 
Visual’s top management held the ESG Product as a success.  
Stage 2, 2009-12: Challenges in selling the ESG Product 
In the three years that followed the launch of the ESG Product, and despite its initial promise, 
product sales stalled, expectations went unrealized, and plans were quietly adjusted to shield 
the project from the scrutiny of the rest of the organization. As we describe below, the 
disappointing performance of the ESG Product during the years 2009-2012 reveals the 
rigidities that a company might encounter in its attempts to engage in translation.  
The first challenge to Visual’s product emerged one month after its launch: the SRI 
data providers experienced dramatic consolidation. This pushed almost every one of the early 
pioneers in SRI data into the arms of a mainstream financial data provider, suggesting a 
decisive shift towards the mainstream that appeared to fulfill the shift from SRI to ESG. 
However, in the following months Charles and his team confronted the failure of the ESG 
Product to sell. Visual attributed sales to the ESG team when it sold a new license to an ESG 
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group in a bank or fund. Charles’ goal was to sell 130 licenses by the end of 2009 but by 
year-end the team had only sold fourteen. During the first half of 2010 the team sold 75 units, 
dramatically short of the 547 units goal. Sales did not appreciably increase during 2011, and 
the revised sales target for the year, 200 licenses, was not met. Even the number of users of 
the ESG Product remained low relative to the total installed base: 2,400 unique users in 2009, 
versus an installed base of several hundred thousand. By 2012 Charles began to admit that 
results were definitely mixed: “I go back and forth between being excited and depressed,” he 
confided to us.  
In accounting for this underperformance, Charles explained that Visual’s sales and 
marketing team, which was in charge of promoting the ESG Product, had “not tried very 
hard.” But we also learnt that budget constraints had played a role. In November 2010 
Charles surprised us with what seemed a puzzling decision: instead of submitting a new 
business plan to the Chairman to gain more resources, as he had originally intended to do, he 
decided to ask for a much lower level of “stop-gap” resources. By doing so, the request 
would not be subject to a high degree of scrutiny. The reason for the change was fear of 
opposition by Bob Allen (pseudonymous), head of the Financial Products unit at Visual. The 
implication, however, was that there would be fewer resources than expected for the ESG 
team. Opposition to ESG within Visual was also experienced by Takumi, the junior member 
of the ESG team. “Many people in Visual don't believe ESG is material. For instance, the 
equity business. They don't like us.”  
Another reason for the disappointing sales appeared to be that Visual’s ESG Product 
did not fit the practices of the users. Some leading ESG investors that we interviewed found 
Visual’s tool insufficiently detailed as it was limited to self-reported data. Many other ESG 
investors did not use Visual because they needed ESG ratings. In fact, numerous SRI 
investors also relied on the ratings provided by SRI data vendors. Without ratings, as one 
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noted: “it’s very hard to use [Visual’s] data from an investing point of view.” In most cases 
investors had only started to experiment with ESG investing, had not yet developed in-house 
capabilities to use the raw ESG data, and preferred to rely on the judgment developed by 
specialized SRI data vendors.  
The mismatch between Visual’s product and its potential customers is illustrated by 
the difference in affordances between Visual and its competitors. As Table 1 suggests, Visual 
was not offering many of the features that its competitors were. While Visual’s product only 
provided raw ESG data, competitors 2 and 4 provided ratings as numerous portfolio 
managers demanded. While Visual’s product did not offer “derived data,” its competitors did. 
Finally, Visual did not provide ESG research, but smaller mainstream vendors such as 
Competitor 5 or large ESG specialists like Competitor 2 did. The same pattern can be seen in 
the consolidated ESG data vendors after the mergers. As the right-hand side of Table 3 
shows, Merger 1, Merger 2 and Merger 3 offered a far more comprehensive set of 
affordances than Visual.  
------ Insert Table 1 about here ----- 
Failed translation. The disappointing sales of Visual’s ESG Product during 2009, 
2010 and 2011 speak to the difficulties experienced by the ESG team at Visual in translating 
the interests of its potential users. By failing to offer ESG ratings and limiting the information 
available on the system to as-reported data, Visual’s product was ignoring the needs of 
numerous investors. This double limitation sharply reduced the rate of adoption of Visual’s 
ESG Product. Visual confronted one additional factor that further reduced user adoption: it 
had failed to enroll its competitors. The merger between the original SRI data providers and 
mainstream financial data vendors in 2009 prevented the “commoditization” of the ESG data 
that Charles initially hoped for. Instead of being absorbed by Visual, SRI investors ended up 
being part of three consolidated, one-stop-shop alternatives to Visual. Furthermore, these did 
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have the required functionalities for ESG investors.  
In sum, the difficulties experienced by Visual during the period 2009-2012 can be 
summed up as a failure to translate. The recognition that the translation, or the process of 
getting potential allies interested and then controlled, did not adequately take place poses 
additional questions. Had Charles and his team been unaware of this danger at the time of 
designing the tool? And if they had, why did they not address it? Our answer to this question 
points to the limits of translation in the context of institutional change. 
The first of these limits highlights the challenges posed by new associations. Visual‘s 
ESG Product combined technical affordances aimed at two different groups: on the one hand, 
financial data for mainstream investors; on the other, ESG data for responsible investors. By 
combining these two in the same black box, Charles anticipated a powerful juxtaposition: the 
interests of both would be better served by virtue of the combination. Yet the juxtaposition 
did not work, because key executives at Visual, represented by Bob Allen, resisted in 
introduction of ESG ratings for fear of antagonizing Visual’s mainstream customers. The 
resulting functionality gap, combined with the mergers among competitors, contributed to 
limit the sales of the Visual’s ESG Product. 
The second determinant of Visual’s failure to translate was an extension of the first. 
In light of the disappointing sales from 2009 to 2012, Charles was reluctant to expose his tool 
to the scrutiny of Visual’s top managers (including Bob Allen) in a new round of funding. By 
giving up on the extra funding, the ESG team lost its ability to pay for a marketing drive to 
promote the tool and support the necessary growth in the responsible investment field. These 
two factors contributed to the failure in triggering a self-fulfilling prophecy as Charles 
expected.  
Stage 3, 2012-14: A shift in strategy 
Subsequent events at Visual, however, point to a partial solution to the problems of 
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translation encountered by Charles and his team. Through the enrolment of more actors, more 
forms of action, and more spheres of activity into the project, Charles and his team were able 
to increase the use of the ESG Product and meet at least some of their original goals. Starting 
in the summer of 2012, Charles changed the ESG Product strategy. He abandoned his initial 
hopes to create a technology that would make responsible investment financially profitable. 
Visual, he concluded, did not have the capabilities, identity or track record to develop a 
device to transform the responsible investment field. He explained: 
Visual historically does not create things like Black-Sholes. We don’t. We simply, you know, 
we create standards by distributing them. We don’t create them. So, we will not -- we never 
will be the leader in that. We will not … shape the field in that way, you see what I mean?  
 
In other words, Charles thought that Visual could not create a new standard. The self-
fulfilling project was abandoned, and Charles’ new strategy entailed a different approach to 
translation. This approach entailed a form of political work, aimed at “anchoring” the 
calculative device within field-wide institutions by recruiting “relevant actors into coalitions 
and networks and establishing rules and regulations” (Perkman and Spicer 2008: 825). 
Enrolling Visual’s executives. Charles and his team changed the way in which they 
made the case for ESG within Visual when engaging its top management. In 2013 Charles 
hired a product manager for the ESG team that reported directly to the head of Visual’s 
Product unit. The ESG Product would thus be developed and marketed from the core of the 
company, and there would be somebody who made sure that it was integrated in the core 
Visual product, and that helped Charles overcome the ESG team’s disconnect with the rest of 
the organization. The product manager explained to us that, “at Visual the business is 
dominated by the ‘core product.’ There are other businesses … but those are minor. Now, 
ESG is part of the core product [so] having a product manager is a big success.”  
The consolidation of the field opened up an opportunity for a different type of demand 
for Visual’s product. The growth of an investor-led coalition that advocated for responsible 
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investment, the so-called Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) initiative, had put 
pressure on asset managers to engage in responsible investment in order to win mandates to 
manage corporate pension plans. This created a new business case for ESG; as Charles 
explained, 
That is being driven by PRI ... In the last six months, Goldman Sachs, PIMCO, Blackrock, 
Alliance Bernstein, these are giant asset management firms, have all signed PRI. We had 
meetings with big clients, several very large asset managers. And they had senior people there 
saying this is important. 
 
In other words, the formal commitment to responsible investment by asset management firms 
created a new reason for potential demand: compliance. This could eventually lead to 
increased sales for Visual. The change was echoed by the ESG Product manager,  
Now it’s a lot more about the regulatory environment and compliance (…) it’s a lot more 
about the fact that ESG is now part of RFPs [requests for proposals] and that without it asset 
managers are going to be excluded from beauty parades [bids to manage corporate pension 
plans]. 
 
Senior managers, in other words, accepted the argument that regulatory compliance might 
drive up sales.  
Enrolling competitors. Charles and his team accepted that Visual would not be 
offering its own ESG ratings; instead, they started distributing ratings from its two rivals, 
Merger 2 and Merger 3. The move reversed Charles’ early focus on building the ESG Product 
internally, and was a response to the mounting evidence that users preferred ratings over raw 
data. The rival’s ratings were offered for free, and for an extra charge users could click on 
them and obtain a PDF document with the underlying research. The collaboration went 
beyond selling data to include joint events and seminars for clients. The irony was not lost on 
Takumi, who remarked, “we said that we're going to take down [Merger 2]. But you know, 
we provide their research from Visual’s platform.” 
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These efforts recognized that Visual’s initial strategy had not been in line with the 
needs of the users, who did not have yet the internal capabilities and work practices to 
effectively use the raw ESG data. As the Product Manager acknowledged: 
The uptake of this product in the form of raw company data has been more challenging… the 
second wave of investment approaches after screening out what is objectionable is using 
someone else’s scoring and ticking a box.  
 
The responsible investment field, in other words, had evolved in a way that called for ratings, 
not ESG raw data. Hence the change at Visual.  
Enrolling NGOs. Third, Charles initiated a concerted effort to fund and orchestrate 
the activity of a variety of non-profit organizations that sought to standardize ESG metrics 
and make them relevant. Charles convinced the Visual Foundation, a philanthropic division 
of the company, to give a three million-dollar grant to Sustainable Accounts (pseudonymous), 
a non-governmental organization that sought to establish that ESG variables have an effect on 
stock prices. Visual also supported Sustainable Accounts in other ways; as Charles put it, 
“they’re sitting in our office, they’re using our machines.” The strategy used by Sustainable 
Accounts was to compile lists of sector-specific standardized ESG metrics that it would ask 
the SEC to include within the mandatory Form 10-K. One of the team members also became 
a board member in one of the Sustainable Accounts working groups.  
Beyond Sustainable Accounts, Charles lobbied the Visual Foundation to fund other 
NGOs that were part of what Charles called the ESG “ecosystem.” It was not difficult to 
prompt their interest; as Charles explained, “all of these groups are non-profits. When I gave 
one million to Sustainable Accounts (…) they all came knocking. They’re like, ‘how can we 
talk about an expanded relationship?’” Charles’ support, however, was strategic: he mapped 
all the NGOs operating in the space, segmenting them by audience and issue. “Some of the 
organizations don't like being pigeon-holed that way,” Charles explained. But, he added, “I 
needed this slide to convince the people at Visual Philanthropies.” By showing them the slide 
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(Figure 2 reports an anonymized version), Charles could make the case that “they're all 
playing to our different specific roles.”  
A new assemblage. The non-profit funding strategy described above also entailed a 
new role for Visual. The associations drawn up by Charles were now of a different nature; as 
he said, “there are some things that are just low-hanging fruit, like linkage documents and 
simple MOUs [memoranda of understanding] and common language that you use publicly 
when describing the other. Some are at the organizational level (…). And we were suggesting 
that we would help fund a process that got the relevant parties together and try to find where 
the commonality was to create a little more clarity for the broader market essentially.” 
Charles had gone as far as to publish this plan in an article on an academic/ practitioner 
journal. 
In sum, Charles’ new strategy entailed changes in translation at several levels. Within 
Visual, it called for a new Product Manager and a case for a compliance-led demand built on 
broader changes in the field. Among users, it entailed providing them the critical feature that 
the ESG Product missed in the past, ESG ratings, even if they were not Visual’s own. With 
the NGOs, it took the form of financial support with the ultimate goal of creating a regulator-
approved standard, partly accomplished by redefining the role that each NGOs played in the 
ESG ”ecosystem” In sum, whether with Visual managers, ESG investors, or NGOs, Visual’s 
strategy relied on what actor network theorists denote by enrolment (Callon, 1986).   
Outcome. The shift appears to have been successful in several ways. By 2013, the 
ESG Product enjoyed wider adoption, with 9,669 unique users versus 2,415 in 2009.  Much 
of this progress happened since the shift in strategy in 2012, and it is possible to discern clear 
progress along three different fronts. First, within Visual Charles appeared to have persuaded 
many colleagues of the value of the ESG Product beyond the direct sales it generates. In a 
recent meeting of the management committee, Charles told us, the new CEO of Visual was 
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asked, “hey, is this important to our business?" And the CEO responded, "It is. Clients expect 
it of us. We have to deliver this now, and it's an important piece." 
Second, Visual’s customers exhibited a greater appreciation for Visual’s ESG 
Product. Here we draw on data from a market research company that began publishing a 
ranking of responsible investment research providers in 2012. Following standard practice, 
this company had ranked data providers by polling investors and portfolio managers (Table 
2). In the 2012 ranking Visual was listed as the 13th ranked firm out of 24 positions in the 
category “Best Independent SRI research provider.” In 2013 it kept the same position, but by 
2014, it climbed 9 positions and reached 4th. The 2014 survey also reported some of the 
comments of the respondents. The only comment in which Visual was mentioned presented 
its product in a positive light: “little progress has also been made on data quality, systems and 
methodologies except for Visual.”  
Finally, the size of the responsible investment field has more than tripled. In 2014, 
more than 1,200 asset owners and asset managers signed up to the Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI), with upwards of $45 trillion in assets under management (AUM). 
Sustainable Accounts has consolidated its position in the field and started to engage policy 
makers, and in 2014 it succeeded in recruiting a former chairman of the SEC as Vice-Chair of 
the board. Conversations between Sustainable Accounts and FASB (the organization that 
establishes US financial accounting and reporting standards) began to take place in 2014, a 
critical step towards the development of mandatory sustainability reporting standards.  
Despite the success of Charles’ change in strategy, he also recognized the downside in 
the new form of assemblage. He remains convinced that his earlier strategy would have been 
more effective in driving the growth of the responsible investing field, but acknowledges that 
the kind of change he envisioned would have required much larger investments than the ones 
he was able to get from Visual: 
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I think the market could be bigger for ESG if we had created it. In my view, yes, we are 
serving the demand (…) the one regret I have is that we didn't invest full-throttle at the time 
that we originally - you know, we're still kind of executing on our 2008 plan essentially. 
Some days I wake up so proud of everything we've done, and other days I'm like I cannot 
believe that we've not done more. But that's life. 
 
------ Insert Table 2 about here ----- 
Discussion 
Our study of Visual Markets explored the company’s efforts to design and sell a new data 
product for responsible investors. The initial plan entailed the introduction of a new 
calculative device and the transformation of the field through the triggering of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. This plan, however, was not successful, and the company shifted to a strategy that 
entailed broader but non-material associations such as enrolling top executives, competitors, 
and standard-setting NGOs in a more heterogeneous assemblage. This second attempt proved 
successful in driving product sales and field change. The resistance encountered by Charles to 
his original plan, as well as his relative success in the second attempt, offer an opportunity to 
theorize the role of institutions in the process of translation, as well as to further understand 
the role institutional work play in performative processes. Figure 3 offers a visualization of 
the theory that we develop in this section.  
 
------ Insert Figure 3 about here ----- 
 
The challenges of translation. Charles’ first and most ambitious translation project, 
his initial performative strategy, was met with resistance by most of the actors he tried to 
enroll. While the resistance of competitors is perhaps easier to understand, as Charles’ plan 
was clearly hostile to their long-term independence, the resistance of other units at Visual and 
the relative lack of interests among investors was more surprising and requires further 
analysis. Charles’ plan to enroll investors in mainstream finance relied on an innovative 
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normative association, bringing to ESG data the values of objectivity and legitimacy 
associated with quantitative finance. The ideal user Charles targeted was not traditional SRI 
investors, nor corporate CSR managers, but traders and portfolio managers in large 
investment banks and buy-side asset managers. This, he thought, would bring instant 
legitimacy to ESG, quickly attracts users who would apply existing quantitative investment 
practices to ESG investing, and in turn make Visual the “obligatory passage point” (Callon, 
1986) in the field.  
However, Charles did not anticipate that association works both ways: infusing 
environmental and social variables with the legitimacy and quantitative affordances of 
mainstream finance called for including ratings, but doing so would also, in the eyes of 
Visual’s top management, cast a shadow of subjectivity and opaqueness on Visual’s ESG tool 
and on Visual at large. This reaction is to large extent a function of Visual’s central position 
in mainstream finance, and the perception that the information displayed on Visual’s screen 
was objectively “true.” Other (more peripheral) competitors, however, offered different 
products to different audiences and were more flexible in taking up ESG ratings in their 
offering. In sum, Charles’ initial strategy faced resistance from Visual’s top management, 
who were attached to a set of properties of the data they sold, and that, in their eyes, ESG 
ratings lacked.  
To overcome these barriers, Charles explored alternative associations to the ones he 
initially envisioned, and successfully enrolled the Visual Foundation and various NGOs to 
whom he “assigned” a specific role in the future ecosystem of responsible investment. In 
theorizing this second and more successful form of assemblage, we note that the calculative 
device was no longer the critical source of durability in the associations. Charles turned to 
money (a funding strategy), the law (memoranda of understanding), academia (an article 
about his plans) and organization (a new product manager). The new glue that tied the new 
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assemblage was thus not the hardware and software of the data license, but a diverse set of 
less material associations of a legal, intellectual, and organizational nature.  
Why were these associations more successful than the previous ones? In providing an 
answer, we build on the institutional work literature and rely on two concepts that identify 
how institutional processes facilitate performative projects.  
Assembling a Normative Network. One explanation for the effectiveness of Charles’ 
second attempt lies in the heterogeneity of the actors involved in it, who allowed Visual to be 
more effective in straddling the financial and social institutional fields.  In his first attempt at 
translation, Charles had explicitly limited the involvement of NGOs, and focused his team on 
potential mainstream users. By including NGOs in the second attempt, Charles was able to 
leverage the work that these organizations had already been doing for years in creating 
legitimacy for responsible investing. Charles, in other words, stopped trying to be the “solo 
performateur,” attempting to change the field only through the material affordances of his 
calculative device; and started to engage as well in institutional work. When read through the 
lens of the literature on institutional work, Charles’ attempt is not just any form of network 
construction, but one that aimed at creating a normative network. Lawrence & Suddaby 
(2006) have defined normative network as “interorganizational connections through which 
practices become normatively sanctioned and which form the relevant peer group with 
respect to normative compliance, monitoring, and evaluation.” Our case suggests that the 
normative network promoting Visual’s ESG Product not only included NGOs but also 
competitors and Visual’s new Product Manager, as all of them were directed at increasing the 
legitimacy of the tool in the eyes of external and internal audiences.  
Charles’ reliance on a normative network is a direct outcome of the presence of 
normative and institutional constraints on the potential assemblage that Charles was allowed 
to build, and suggests that institutional norms (such as “no ratings”) and values (like 
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“transparency,” “objectivity,” etc.) mediate the success of the development of material tools, 
alerting to the importance of institutional factors in explaining what performative projects 
succeed. The assembly of the normative network also points to the crucial role that multi-
level field dynamics (Gray, Purdy & Ansari, 2015; Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012) 
play in shaping the opportunities for effective performative projects.  The translation 
trajectory of Visual’s ESG project was initially shaped by Charles’ design decisions, then 
constrained by organizational and field-level normative associations, and eventually 
(partially) resolved with the bottom-up assembly of a novel normative network (Smets, 
Morris & Greenwood, 2012).  
Assembling a Regulatory Network. The second explanation for the success of Charles’ 
second attempt stems from his decision to anchor the NGO strategy around the PRI and 
Sustainable Accounts. In particular, Charles’ enrolment of Sustainable Accounts is both a 
direct attempt to inscribe his tool in an industry standard, and an indirect attempt to enroll the 
regulatory power of SEC. In other words, Charles was foregoing the durability offered by a 
material device in exchange for the strength afforded by legal and organizational 
associations.  Notably, Charles neither launched Sustainable Accounts nor designed its 
strategy to leverage the existing regulatory infrastructure and foster more ESG reporting from 
corporations. But he realized he could catalyze this process by supporting it through the 
Visual Foundation and help them setup a persuasive board of directors. Similarly, Charles 
benefited from a new source of demand for Visual’s product, compliance, which was the 
result of changes in the field of responsible investment driven by the PRI. This form of 
institutional work is akin to what Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 216) call enabling work, 
that is, to “facilitate, supplement and support institutions. This may include the creation of 
authorizing agents or new roles needed to carry on institutional routines or diverting 
resources (i.e., taxation) required to ensure institutional survival.” Because the term enabling 
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work is overly broad, we propose instead assembling a regulatory network to emphasize the 
difference between the work entailed in rewiring normative association from that entailed in 
changing regulation in practice. 
The concept of regulatory network sheds light on the ways in which regulatory 
processes can be assimilated in various “performative projects”, whether it is through 
enrolling, fundraising, lending facilities, or sitting on boards. Economic sociologists have 
started to direct attention towards the distributed nature of regulatory activity, showing how 
ambiguous financial innovation can undermine the effectiveness of financial regulation (Funk 
& Hirschman, 2014), and how various relational configuration between regulators, the 
regulated and other actors can lead to different outcomes (Thiemann & Lepoutre, 2017).  Our 
findings contribute to this research by showing how the regulatory networks examined in the 
aforementioned studies were built in the early stage of development of a financial practice, as 
part of a broader performative project.  
Performative work  
To capture the theoretical significance of the two aforementioned mechanisms, we 
conceptualize the overall process we identified as performative work. We define performative 
work as the necessary institutional work to enable translation and the subsequent adoption of 
the device. Performative work emphasizes the gains from jointly considering the emphasis on 
materiality that characterizes the performativity literature with the attention to norms, roles 
and resources that is found in institutional theory. As in the canonical Callon-MacKenzie 
notion of performativity, performative work aims at the construction of market agencement 
(Callon, 2013; Callon, 2016), but instead of relying solely on the durable associations created 
by material artifacts through black-boxing, it also builds on the seemingly weaker ones 
created by norms, laws, organizations, and regulations. Despite this semblance of weakness, 
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we contend that this alternative route to performativity may better overcome institutional 
resistance.  
The idea that performativity entails institutional work is consistent with Millo and 
MacKenzie’s (2009) analysis of Black-Scholes. These authors do not explain the adoption of 
the formula solely on the basis of its mathematical elegance and Fisher Black’s pricing 
sheets, but also on the adoption of new risk management tools that necessitated the use of the 
formula. Our approach is also consistent with recent attempts to bring together performativity 
and institutional theory in empirical studies of responsible investment. For instance, 
Giamporcaro and Gond (2016) explore how, in the construction of the SRI market in France, 
the micro-politics of calculative practices intersected with the macro-politics of market 
building. These dynamics had both an enabling and a constraining effect, decreasing the 
freedom of the rating agency. Slager et al. (2012) draw attention to various types of 
institutional work entailed in developing and institutionalizing the FTSE4Good index, and 
argue that the widening of the objectives of the index from its original focus as an investment 
tool towards becoming a standard for CSR practices was critical to its success. 
Contributions to the performativity literature 
Over the past two decades, Callon’s theory of performativity has simultaneously intrigued 
and challenged scholars in sociology and organization theory. Yet, with few exceptions, 
institutional theory (Fourcade, 2007; Lounsbury, 2008; Powell & Colyvas, 2008) has only 
recently started to integrated performativity insights in its theoretical toolkit.  Our study has 
sought to advance this integration by recasting performativity within the original intellectual 
project of Actor-Network Theory, and by leveraging the concept of translation to empirically 
explore how actors can attempt change the institutions of financial markets. Our analysis 
articulates the role of normative networks (establishing organizational, financial, legal and 
institutional associations) and regulatory networks (enrolling regulatory agencies) in an 
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approach that we call performative work.  
Bringing back ANT and translation into performativity contributes to better specify 
the role of assemblages (Callon & Latour, 1981), socio-technical agencements (Callon, 
2007), and market agencements (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010; Callon, 2016) in performativity. 
While these concepts implicitly are about translation, arguing that effective performativity 
requires (or better, is synonymous with) the construction of socio-technical agencements, it 
also leaves unspecified the theoretical criteria that explain their effectiveness (Cochoy, 
Trompette & Araujo, 2016). By contrast, bringing back the original insights of ANT and its 
focus on translation provides a clearer empirical focus, as well as theoretical criteria to 
explain the relative effectiveness of the two performative attempts at Visual4. Furthermore, 
our approach is consistent with Callon’s recent framing of market agencements as innovation 
(Callon, 2016), a move that obviously stems from the ANT-performativity lineage we traced 
in the introduction. Innovation projects like the one we studied at Visual are the engine of 
markets, and their success “rests on the skillful articulation of human and technical elements” 
(Cochoy et al. 2016: 8). Our emphasis on performative work offers an opportunity to further 
our understanding of what this skillful articulation entails: designing the calculative device, 
assembling a normative and a regulatory network. Institutional theorists would suggest that 
attending to the normative and regulatory network might be especially important in interstitial 
issue field (Zietsma et al., 2017) like the one we studied, as responsible investment straddled 
fields, bringing together traditional financial actors, NGOs, Unions, and Governments. In this 
context performative work is likely to be less “blackboxing,” and more “catalyzing” action 
across heterogeneous actors (Furnari, 2014, 2016).  
                                                        
4 The theoretical importance of this shift might be lost if we do not consider that norms and 
legitimacy are not in the ANT vocabulary, which especially in Latour and Callon’s early 
work, emphasizes interests and materiality. “Social forces,” “norms,” “institutions,” that is, 
the bread-and-butter of sociological explanations, were questioned as credible sources of 
explanations (Latour, 1987; Latour, 2005, p. 1). 
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We theorized performative work in the context of the responsible investment field, 
and thus the role of calculative device might be more prominent in our setting than in other 
contexts. For instance, from a critical performativity perspective (Leca, Gond & Barin-Cruz, 
2014; Spicer et al. , 2009), future studies should explore whether performative projects 
outside of the financial field require a different mix of the strategies we identified.  
Contributions to institutional work 
The concept of performative work contributes to the literature on institutional work by 
extending the concept of normative network and regulatory network (Lawrence, Suddaby & 
Leca, 2009) to the realm of performativity and material artifacts. In doing so, we address the 
call for institutional theorists to “explore the implicit value systems that underlie how certain 
objects function” (Jones et al., 2013): 67) and the role artifacts play in institutional processes.  
Performative work is different from institutional work in that it entails the creation of 
a distinct artefactual layer at the infrastructure of the focal industry, with critical implications 
for what Lawrence, Leca & Zilber (2013: 1026) call the “how, who, and what” of 
institutional work. Regarding the how, performative work aims at ensuring the circulation of 
calculative devices. As with organizational rules, legal dispositions, etc., calculative devices 
are structures that constrain action. However, the durable material nature of these artifacts 
open up the possibility to black-box them, that is, strengthen and simplify constraints upon 
choice. The upside is a much greater degree of coordinated action across actors, sizeable 
enough to open up the door to self-fulfilling prophecies in a market, and even force non-
adopters to join. In this manner, performative work adds to existing efforts in institutional 
theory to incorporate materiality (Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Jones & Massa, 2013). Finally, 
performative work can be seen as a prior state to Callon-MacKenzie performative projects: as 
Millo and MacKenzie (2009) make clear, eventually the price of stock options did change in 
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line with the Black-Scholes model, but it was only once the appropriate conditions had been 
laid out in terms of the actors’ interests and government regulations.  
Second, the who, or identity of the actors entailed in performative work, is different 
from institutional work. Our case suggests that performative work is undertaken by the 
suppliers of calculative tools. While Kraatz (2009) suggests that institutional work requires 
involvement by the leader of the organization, performative work can be led by peripheral 
actors. It also contrasts with the performativity literature, which has stressed the role of 
proponents of theory. In line with (Dorado, 2013), performative work requires collectives 
with material production skills and routines. More importantly, much of the task of 
performative work is catalyzing the efforts of others (Furnari, 2014, 2016), however, the case 
of Visual suggests that corporate actors occupying central positions in the field might be at a 
disadvantage in conducting this catalytic work, which requires more diverse organizational 
forms, and perhaps a more central role for NGOs.  
Third, the what of performative work is also distinct. Building on Emirbayer and 
Mische (1988), Battilana and Aunno (2009) suggested that intentionality in institutional work 
should be interpreted as a multidimensional construct, comprising iterative (past-oriented), 
projective (future-oriented), and practical-evaluative (present-oriented) dimensions, and 
speculated that each dimension might dominate in specific forms of institutional work or 
stage of the institutionalization process. Raviola and Norbäck (2013) studied the digital 
transition of a financial newspaper and showed how the enabling properties of the new 
technology (projective agency) where always evaluated through the prism of the old 
technology (iterative and practical-evaluative agency). We contribute to this line of research, 
by showing how, over the three different stages of the Visual project, the dominant form of 
agency shifted from projective (Charles’ initial plan), to iterative (how other units and Visual 
and the client interpreted the novel device), and practical-evaluative (Charles’ shifting 
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trajectory of action). We also show how the process was mediated by the existing material 
infrastructure which constrained the design options for the device, and the reception the 
device received from other units in Visual and among clients.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, our account speaks to the ongoing debate over performativity. It casts 
in a new light the arguments of the critics of performativity, who had asked for a more 
prominent role of politics (Fligstein & Goldstein, 2010; Nik-Khah, 2007) and for better-
defined scope conditions for performativity (Felin & Foss, 2009; Zuckerman, 2012). The 
theory we develop for effective translation on the basis of our case analysis can be interpreted 
as introducing a set of institutional scope conditions for effective performativity. Given our 
research design we cannot establish whether this condition is necessary, but the shift in 
strategy we observed at Visual provided us with enough analytical leverage to establish its 
existence.  
We hope that this contribution will also advance the performativity debate past its 
framing as one of constructionists vs. realists (Felin & Foss, 2009; Zuckerman, 2012), and 
further instead the engagement between performativity and institutional theory (Fourcade, 
2007; Gond & Nyberg, 2016; Gond, Cabantous & Krikorian, 2016; Michael Lounsbury, 
2007; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Slager et al., 2012) by bringing back translation and 
emphasizing the role of normative networks and regulatory work. By highlighting the 
equivalence of material and institutional associations, our study bridges the performativity 
and institutional theory literatures, illuminating the role of devices as well as norms in 
contexts of institutional change.  
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Table 2. Rankings of Visual and other ESG data provider, 2012-2014. 
 
 
Source: Independent Research in Responsible Investment Survey, 2012-2014.  
Note: We only reported the ranking of the top 10 ranked providers in 2014. The other competitors listed were not included in table 3 above because they were 
focused on one (or few) countries, and/or focused on one of the E, S, and G factors only. Competitor Merger 1 was only listed in 2012 and ranked 23.   
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Figure 1.  Timeline and key events in the development of the ESG Product at Visual Market 
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Figure 2. Excerpt of a slide used by Charles to articulate the roles of various NGOS 
relevant for the RI field. 
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Figure 3. Translation and Performative Work in Performativity. 
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Table 1. Comparison of Visual ESG Product Affordances with Main Global Competitors in 2008 and 2012. 
 
Source: Adapted from Visual's ESG Product competitive analysis and our fieldwork. The Financial Data Vendors were competing with Visual in 2008 across 
different markets but were not offering environmental, social and governance data.  
Note: In this table, we only selected the vendors competing with Visual at a global scale, and who offered data and ratings on environmental, social and 
governance dimensions. The term "combined search" is not native but our own. 
  
 2008  2012 
 
Competitor1 
(SRI data 
vendor) 
 
Competitor 2 
(SRI data 
vendor ) 
 
Competitor 3 
(SRI data 
vendor ) 
 
Competitor 4 
(SRI data 
vendor ) 
 
Competitor 5 
(Financial 
Data Vendor) 
 
Competitor 6 
(Financial 
Data Vendor) 
 
Visual 
 
 Merger 1 
(Competitors  
1 + 6) 
 
Merger 2 
(Competitors 
2+3 ) 
 
Merger 3 
(competitors 
4+5) 
 
Visual 
 
Financial information and 
Pricing data 
          
Indices 
 
          
Global coverage 
 
            
As reported environmental, 
social and governance data 
            
Derived environmental, 
social and governance data 
            
Plant-level data (e.g. Toxic 
Release Inventory) 
            
Environmental, social and 
governance Ratings 
            
Environmental, social and 
governance Research 
            
Buy list 
 
            
Combined  search 
 
            
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Table 2. Rankings of Visual and other ESG data provider, 2012-2014. 
 
Firm 
Position 
2012 
Position 
2013 
Position 
2014 
Competitor Merger 2 1 1 1 
Competitor Merger 3 2 2 2 
Other competitor (national) 4 8 3 
Visual 13 13 4 
Other competitor (Environment only)  4 5 
Other competitor (national) 8 6 6 
Other competitor (national) 3 5 7 
Other competitor 11  8 
Other competitor 9 7 9 
Other competitor (national) 6 9 10 
 
Source: Independent Research in Responsible Investment Survey, 2012-2014.  
Note: We only reported the ranking of the top 10 ranked providers in 2014. The other competitors listed were not included in table 3 above because they were 
focused on one (or few) countries, and/or focused on one of the E, S, and G factors only. Competitor Merger 1 was only listed in 2012 and ranked 23.   
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Figure 1.  Timeline and key events in the development of the ESG Product at Visual Market 
 
 
 
Sources: (1) US SIF, (2) EUROSIF, (3) Global Sustainable Investment Review (GSIA)
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Figure 2. Excerpt of a slide used by Charles to articulate the roles of various NGOS 
relevant for the RI field. 
 
 
 
 
